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May the commands then of a Prince be opposed? May he be resisted as
often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not
Right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all Polities, and instead of
Government and Order leave nothing but Anarchy and Confusion.'
I. INTRODUCTION
State by state lawyer licensing is grossly inefficient and invites protectionist
abuse. It is also here to stay, and for good reason. Some of those good rea-
sons are explored in this article. Abuses and more palpable failures of the
present system are also examined.
These propositions are defended: State-based bar admission is preferable
to a national system, although some existing state standards are indefensible.
National standards do and should govern much state policy; and they are
especially needed (and sorely lacking) in the motion admission process.
In addition, this article advances into the largely uncharted region of ex-
tra-territorial law practice. While unauthorized practice rules seem to estab-
lish impenetrable barriers at state lines, the reality of multistate practice on a
single state license is commonplace. It is impossible to reconcile the law as it
is written with the law as it is practiced. The law must be changed.
Admittedly, the state-based system of bar admission causes serious
problems. This is an era of multistate, even multinational, law firms. Partic-
ular legal matters are often oblivious to state boundaries, requiring lawyers to
research the laws and visit the courtrooms and law offices of many states.
Individual clients often require legal advice on the laws of many states and
nations. The fact is that many lawyers must engage in the multistate practice
of law, even though bar admission still occurs one state at a time.
It is impractical to secure bar admission in more than a handful of states;
yet, during the course of a lawyer's career, a lawyer may well engage in prac-
tice in more than a dozen states. Moreover, it may be totally unpredictable
which states those will be until a particular matter arises, at which point
* Visiting Professor of Law, New England School of Law. Ben Fernandez and Thomas Diaz
provided excellent research assistance for this article. Professors Peter Rofes and Christine Wise-
man graciously commented on earlier drafts.
1. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 419 (P. Laslett rev. 2d ed. 1970).
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securing timely bar admission is impossible. In addition, the state-based sys-
tem is abused through protectionist or xenophobic rules. The problems for
the multistate lawyer are serious, especially considering the prohibitions in
ethical rules and the criminal law against unauthorized practice. 2 These
problems have prompted discussions about a national system of bar admis-
sion, presumably in the belief that the state-based system is an anachronism
whose problems are endemic and incurable.
In response to that critique, this article identifies the justifications for law-
yer licensing and argues that formal bar admission should remain state-
based. The state-based system, however, is a complex interplay of national
standards and local (i.e., state-based) standards. Recognizing the national
dimension of many state-based requirements and the realities of contempo-
rary law practice, the article analyzes the circumstances in which bar admis-
sion in the first state should entitle the lawyer to engage in limited forms of
practice in another state, without the requirement of formal bar admission in
that other state.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LAWYER LICENSING
A. GENERALLY
Bar admission rules exist because law practice is a licensed occupation.
The reasons for licensing lawyers should dictate and limit the requirements
for securing a license to practice law. This part of the article will focus on
the justifications for lawyer licensing in the belief that bar admission rules-
who makes them, what they provide, and who applies them-must be as-
sessed in light of the justifications for lawyer licensing.
Much has been written about the history of the legal profession in the
United States. The classic works on the subject were written by Charles
Warren and Alfred Z. Reed early in the twentieth century3 and by Roscoe
Pound several decades later.4 These writers describe a profession whose
power fluctuates. After being virtually outlawed in seventeenth century colo-
nial America, lawyers had risen to positions of power and leadership by the
outbreak of the Revolutionary War. Thereafter, the profession entered a pe-
riod of declining prestige, generally attributed to relaxed bar admission stan-
dards during the Jacksonian era. Finally, after the Civil War, as bar
associations grew in stature and power, the modem era of increasingly strin-
gent standards for bar admission began. 5
2. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Stan-
dard 4.1 commentary at 26 (Tent. Draft 1978).
3. C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911); A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF LAW (1921).
4. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES (1953).
5. More recent accounts of the history of the legal profession include R. STEVENS, LAW
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Throughout the history of the legal profession in America, admission stan-
dards have been widely viewed as either the problem with the profession or
the solution to the profession's problems. At one extreme, bar admission
standards have been seen as tools for implementing racist, sexist, and socially
elitist goals and for providing economic protection to lawyers already li-
censed. At the other extreme, bar admission standards have been seen as the
only effective means by which the quality of the profession could be main-
tained and improved so that the profession properly discharges its public
responsibilities.
The history of bar admission in America reflects sharp division over
whether exacting admission standards help the public or help only the pro-
fession. This division of opinion, however, evidences remarkable agreement
that admission standards substantially affect the composition of the bar and
the quality of its contribution to the nation. Moreover, much of the disagree-
ment, 6 at least since the advent of formal legal education requirements, has
been about the criteria to which the "higher" or "lower" standards are
applied.
Thus, for much of our history and throughout this century, law practice
has been a licensed occupation and entrance has been highly regulated.7
More recently, partial deregulation has occurred as the result of two different
forces. The Supreme Court has deregulated the bar with respect to minimum
fee schedules,8 advertising and solicitation of clients, 9 and residence require-
ments of newly licensed lawyers. 10 On a different front, some legal fields are
no longer the exclusive province of lawyers. Non-lawyers are increasingly
called upon to advise clients with respect to such legal matters as taxes, pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans, and mergers and acquisitions, thus deregulat-
ing the practice of law as to those fields.
A more frontal assault on lawyer licensing and regulation was launched by
W. Clark Durant, III, chairman of the board of the Legal Services Corpora-
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s (1983); L. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 549-66 (1973).
6. The most significant disagreement concerns admission based upon proof of practice elsewhere
(i.e., motion admission). See infra Part III(B)(5).
7. While entrance into the profession may be highly regulated, government policy has been
rather laissez-faire toward lawyers who are already licensed. Expanding disciplinary agencies, more
frequent and larger legal malpractice claims, strict enforcement of frivolous claims rules, and the
common use of disqualification motions may signal increasing regulation of the practicing bar.
8. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, - U.S. _ 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v.
Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
10. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 57 U.S.L.W. 4316 (U.S. March 7, 1989); Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Freidman, - U.S. _ , 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470
U.S. 274 (1985).
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tion's during the Reagan Administration, who called for the massive deregu-
lation of law practice." Bar admission rules were a particular focus of
Durant's criticism.' 2 In Durant's view, the sweeping regulation of law prac-
tice is designed more for the protection of the bar than for the benefit of the
public. Thus, the justifications for licensing lawyers require discussion in or-
der to determine whether there should be bar admission rules and, if so, what
goals those rules should serve. These concerns necessarily precede a discus-
sion of the merits of particular features of the bar admission process.
B. THE SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
According to Emile Durkheim, two general principles organize the divi-
sion of labor in society. Durkheim called these two principles "mechanical
solidarity" and "organic solidarity."' 13 Mechanical solidarity is the most
primitive organization of labor in a community.' 4 Ruled by tradition,
mechanical solidarity is readily identified by its lack of specialization. All
members of the community are engaged in the same kind of work, such as
food gathering or hunting. The community functions as a single mechanism
engrossed in the work of perpetuating itself.
The advent of industrialization forever altered the monocentric order of
mechanical solidarity in society. In response to the diversification of func-
tion necessary in a more complex society, a division of labor developed. The
pivotal characteristic of this organization of labor is specialization. The in-
terdependence among community members, as the product of specialization,
is central to Durkheim's principle of organic solidarity. 15 Durkheim com-
pares organic solidarity to human anatomy, in that the health of the whole
being is intrinsically bound up with the interdependence among the particu-
lar organs. It is organic differences that create bodily order and physical
well-being. The interdependence of community members results from the
various specialized tasks perceived as essential to society's prosperity. Each
occupation performs an essential task. For example, non-lawyers are com-
pelled to rely upon the skills of lawyers for representation and advice within
the complex specialized boundaries of the judicial system. 16
11. Speech by W. Clarke Durant to the American Bar Association Board of Governors in New
Orleans (February 12, 1987). Mr. Durant said: "Shakespeare is wrong. We need not kill all the
lawyers. We simply need to deregulate them. Open up the profession. Broaden the base. Let more
people, let more institutions deliver the services."
12. Id. Mr. Durant said: "State unauthorized practice of law statutes should simply be re-
pealed." He particularly criticized legal education requirements and bar examinations. As to the
latter, he said: "In many states, a board of law examiners can and do vary the pass/fail rate as if
operating a medieval drawbridge."
13. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 41 (G. Simpson trans. 1933).
14. Id. at 70-110.
15. Id. at 111-32.
16. See E. KRAUSE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS 155 (1971).
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When an occupation involves a task that is both essential and involves
specialized knowledge and training, the occupational group achieves a func-
tional power base.' 7 Because of this power base, the community tends to
accept the occupational group's claim that it has the right to define profes-
sional working requirements for itself and to limit professional member-
ship. 1 8 The occupational group often seeks legislative and administrative
support for the enforcement of its self-generated membership requirements
through a system of licensing. The final result is that licensing serves two
masters. It serves both to control entrance into the occupation and to en-
force professional standards among licensed practitioners. Licensing's dual
purposes create the risk that the occupational group may advance its own
interests at the expense of a broader community benefit.' 9
C. PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC
As just discussed, the purpose of licensing is twofold: it limits entrance
into the occupation and it enforces standards of practice among practition-
ers. In its broadest context, licensing can be the vehicle by which the state
satisfies its obligation to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.
Economist Milton S. Friedman has examined the policy reasons behind this
exercise of police power, 20 concluding that the validity of lawyer licensing
rests solely in its capacity to protect the public. In addition to this defensive
purpose, however, lawyer licensing also manifests an affirmative capacity,
which can induce the improvement of the profession itself. This affirmative
purpose is the subject of the next section.
As a regulatory device, licensing is a means by which the state protects
members of the public from injury. Professor Friedman has identified two
facets of this defensive public policy as justifications for licensing: the neigh-
borhood effects hypothesis and the paternalism axiom.
The neighborhood effects hypothesis views licensing as a regulatory exercise
in the collective best interest of the public. In this context, licensing pro-
motes efficiency and a positive interaction between the occupation and the
public. Unqualified practitioners improperly delay and disrupt proceedings,
obstruct negotiations, and generally impede the proper resolution of legal
matters. 21 As such, people other than the lawyer's clients can be harmed by
17. See E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 8 (C. Brookfield trans.
1958).
18. E. Krause, supra note 16, at 168.
19. A compilation of more recent writings about the sociology of the professions, including the
legal profession, can be found in, R. DINGWALL & P. LEWIS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFES-
SIONS (1983).
20. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 144-49 (1962).
21. Of course, the implicit premise in this analysis is that conventional law practice is proper law
practice. The validity of this premise is beyond the scope of this article.
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a lawyer's malperformance, as can the administration of justice itself. There-
fore, lawyer licensing can protect the judicial system against compromise and
impairment of its essential function at the hands of a single practitioner with
deficient skills.
The collective protection inherent in the neighborhood effects hypothesis is
individualized in the paternalism axiom. Under the paternalism axiom, the
public is perceived as incapable of being able to distinguish the competent
practitioner from the incompetent practitioner because of the complexity in-
trinsic to specialized occupations. Therefore, the state is expected to provide
regulation to protect members of the community from their own ignorance
about how to select a qualified lawyer.22
The neighborhood effects hypothesis and the paternalism axiom are both
defensive justifications for lawyer licensing, which support licensing as a
means of protecting the public from unqualified practitioners. The paternal-
ism axiom, premised on a concern for future clients, involves the classic de-
bate between free-market capitalism and twentieth century liberalism. The
neighborhood effects hypothesis, however, seems particularly applicable to
lawyer licensing. In an adversary system of justice that is principally di-
rected by lawyers rather than by public officials, any given lawyer's lack of
qualifications can harm both other participants and the process itself. In
other words, an unqualified lawyer poses a concern for the administration of
justice.
D. IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROFESSION
In addition to Professor Friedman's defensive purposes for occupational
licensing, which focus on the harm that unqualified practitioners cause, law-
yer licensing can serve the positive purpose of improving the abilities of qual-
ified practitioners. Bar admission requirements, particularly education
requirements, impose an experience on future lawyers that may help maxi-
mize their potential as professionals. Thus, lawyer licensing may not simply
keep out the unqualified; it may affirmatively produce better qualified
lawyers.
This positive purpose is best exemplified and, perhaps, best served by legal
education requirements. 23 Law school works as a period of socialization in
which each lawyer develops a common base with other members of the pro-
fession. Law students acquire the ability to communicate more effectively
22. This view of government is much debated, and the debate need not be reenacted here. Pater-
nalistic government policies, especially as regards licensing, are criticized as seriously disruptive of
an efficiently functioning market in professional services. Moreover, critics claim that paternalism
does not work; unqualified lawyers are admitted to the bar every day.
23. But see D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (1983)
(suggesting that legal education effectively serves certain negative purposes).
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with their professional peers. They develop similar strategies for problem
solving; they learn the customs and modes of attire that are common in the
profession; they are exposed to certain values and mores of the profession.
Even beyond this basic integration into the profession, formal law study in
a competitive and demanding environment pushes students to their best ef-
forts. It encourages them to achieve a better understanding of law and legal
institutions and of their own potential as lawyers.24 In this sense, lawyer
licensing requirements can lead to increased competence and professionalism
among lawyers by requiring a pre-admission education that goes beyond
minimal technical proficiency. This is the essence of the positive purpose of
lawyer licensing.
E. OTHER PROFFERED JUSTIFICATIONS
Many people believe that there are too many lawyers. The observations of
Derek Bok, President of Harvard University, that the United States has more
lawyers than other major industrialized nations and that too many of the
most gifted people become lawyers, lends some support to this belief.25 In a
very different way, this same issue surfaced in an action brought by an unsuc-
cessful bar applicant in Arizona who sued that state's bar examiners. He
claimed that the bar examiners set a quota on newly licensed lawyers, pre-
sumably to protect economically those lawyers already licensed. 26 This
claim is not too surprising. Richard Posner has identified numerous regula-
tions governing lawyers that result in higher fees for lawyers without provid-
ing a corresponding public benefit. 27 Thus, assuming that it is possible to
have "too many" lawyers, the question arises whether lawyer licensing re-
quirements are an appropriate means for regulating the number of lawyers.
Economic self-interest could prompt the legal profession to keep its num-
bers low through bar admission rules. As a justification for lawyer licensing,
the economic welfare of lawyers is not compelling. As long as talented peo-
ple are drawn to the profession, the goal of maximizing the income of prac-
tieing lawyers is not a legitimate basis for lawyer licensing. Indeed, President
Bok's complaint that too many of the most gifted people become lawyers is
evidence that there is no need to worry about the economic welfare of law-
yers. Moreover, as long as the market will pay a premium for especially high
24. Of course, this is an appraisal of legal education that many critics would find ridiculously
optimistic and forgiving. Nevertheless, even the most strident critics of legal education usually call
for its reform rather than its abolition. This suggests a widely shared belief in the potential of
formal law study to make a positive difference, even if that potential is unrealized.
25. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 570, 573 (1983). In
fairness to President Bok, it should be noted that his central theme was that too few talented people
enter certain other important occupations.
26. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
27. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 346-48 (1973).
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quality legal service, the profession will continue to attract capable practi-
tioners. It seems unlikely that any circumstances will soon evolve in which
the economic welfare of lawyers would justify lawyer licensing or more re-
strictive bar admission rules.
Stringent lawyer licensing and bar admission standards have also been jus-
tified as likely to improve the public image of the legal profession. This justi-
fication is most commonly raised in connection with character and fitness
standards. 28 Protecting the image of the profession is seen as important so
that the public will not lose confidence in lawyers generally and ultimately in
the legal process itself.
This justification fails, however, because it provides no independent, prin-
cipled basis for lawyer licensing standards. Instead, it defers to public per-
ceptions or, more accurately, to authorities' motions about what the public
perceives. As a rationale for lawyer licensing, protecting the public image of
the profession is a shadow, offering no meaningful guidelines and condoning
flagrantly visceral decision-making.,
F. SUMMARY
Bar admission rules should be judged by how well they serve the legitimate
purposes of lawyer licensing. Lawyer licensing may be justified as serving
two defensive purposes and one positive purpose. The defensive purposes are
directed toward protection of the public from deficient practitioners. These
involve protecting future clients and protecting the administration of justice,
including the legal process itself and participants within it. The positive pur-
pose of lawyer licensing involves requirements, particularly related to educa-
tion, which are intended to increase the competence and professionalism of
all lawyers. This positive purpose, unlike the defensive purposes, is not sim-
ply to keep out unqualified lawyers, but to help produce better qualified law-
yers in the profession as a whole.
Balanced against these justifications for lawyer licensing are three con-
cerns. First, as a matter of fairness if not as a matter of individual liberty,29
reasonably qualified persons should be allowed to practice their chosen occu-
pation. Barriers to bar admission obviously limit opportunities to practice
law. In a free society, we should be highly sensitive to the anti-democratic
effect of bar admission rules; they limit or eliminate important options in
people's lives.
28. See, e.g., In re O'Hallaren, 64 I11. 2d 426, 434, 356 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (1976) ("An attor-
ney's failure to file (income tax) returns and his subsequent conviction of that offense diminish
public confidence in the legal profession and tend to bring it into disrepute."). See also 1987 B.C.
Stat., ch. 25, 1, 45-46 (member of Law Society of British Columbia may be disciplined for conduct
that "harm(s) the standing of the legal profession").
29. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
540 [Vol. 3:533
BAR ADMISSION
Second, the privileged access to government power permitted by a license
to practice law30 demands that the legal profession achieve racial, ethnic,
religious and gender balance. Lawyers effectively control the judicial branch
of government. In addition, their knowledge and skills give them uncommon
access and influence in government generally. In order that segments of soci-
ety are not unfairly excluded from access to and participation in government,
the legal profession must be highly diverse. Lawyer licensing rules should
not be allowed to deprive the profession of needed diversity.
Finally, the number of lawyers should be sufficient to allow economic com-
petition in terms of prices and services. Society is not served by lawyer li-
censing standards that are so rigorous that they seriously reduce the number
of lawyers and consequently reduce access to legal services in terms of cost
and availability.
II. THE INTERPLAY OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL STANDARDS
A. CRITERIA FOR BAR ADMISSION
There is general agreement among states on the criteria for bar admission.
All states impose character and fitness, education, and testing requirements
on some or all bar applicants. 31 Moreover, before Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper,32 residence requirements were commonplace. Finally,
applicants are uniformly required to take an oath prior to admission. 33 Thus,
the criteria considered for bar admission are and have been (at least in recent
30. See 1 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272-80 (H. Reeve trans., P. Bradley ed.,
F. Bowen rev. 1963).
31. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N. & NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (1989) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE].
32. 470 U.S. 274 (1985). See also Barnard v. Thorstenn, 57 U.S.L.W. 4316 (U.S. March 7, 1989).
33. See, e.g., Wis. Sup. CT. R. 40.15, which provides:
The oath or affirmation to be taken to qualify for admission to the practice of law shall be
in substantially the following form:
I will maintian the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be
unjust, or any defense, except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of
the land;
I will employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, such means
only as are consistent with truth and honor, and I will never seek to mislead the judge
or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve the secrets of my client and will accept no
compensation in connection with my client's business except from my client or with my
client's knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with
which I am charged;
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defense-
less or oppressed, or delay any person's cause for lucre or malice. So help me God.
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history) generally uniform among the states. 34 The national bar admission
debate, then, can be narrowly focused. The debate concerns the extent to
which the generally accepted criteria should be uniformly applied through-
out the states, and whether law practice experience in one state should satisfy
the requirements for admission in another state.
States differ in their application of criteria in that they sometimes apply
the same criterion with differing rigor. For example, each state establishes its
own passing score for the Multistate Bar Examination. Criteria are also ap-
plied by some states in highly idiosyncratic ways. For example, a state may
impose a requirement, as part of its education criterion, that bar applicants
complete a particular bridge-the-gap course offered only in that state. These
examples illustrate a "local standard" at work, i.e., a standard that is devel-
oped and applied by a particular jurisdiction and is not consistent with any
generally recognized national norm.
While generally accepted criteria often may be applied under local stan-
dards, certain national standards have also evolved. "National standards"
are those substantive or procedural norms relating to bar admission that are
widely used throughout the states. The foremost national standard relates to
the educational criterion-the requirement that, in order to be admitted to
the bar, a person attain the first professional degree in law from a law school
approved by the American Bar Association. Other national standards relate
to the testing criterion and involve the widespread use of examinations devel-
oped, administered, and scored under rules and procedures used throughout
the nation. National standards are even applied to the character and fitness
criterion, not only as required by federal constitutional law, 3 5 but also as a
result of investigative services performed by the National Conference of Bar
Examiners and used by many states.
Therefore, in considering the national bar admission debate, we must rec-
ognize that there are generally accepted criteria for bar admission and that
these criteria are applied through an interplay of local standards and national
standards. Viewed in this context, the debate over national admission is not
a debate about exclusively national control versus exclusively local control.36
Rather, the debate principally concerns the degree to which each criterion
34. The singular and significant exception to this pattern is the role of law practice experience in
another state as a criterion for bar admission.
35. See, e.g., Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1971); Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
36. National standards for bar admission certainly could reduce the unnecessary burdens on
multistate practice, especially in the area of motion admission. Significant progress would also
result from a better understanding of the extra-territorial privileges that attach to a given state's
license to practice law. See infra Part IV.
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should be applied in each state according to national standards either now in
existence or yet to be developed.
Bar admission standards, whether local or national, must be assessed in
relation to how well those standards serve the purposes of lawyer licensing.
These assessments should not depend solely on the leniency or rigor of a
particular standard. Even a rigorous standard that is valid-in that it corre-
lates highly with actual lawyer performance-could be a poor standard if it is
so restrictive as to seriously reduce the availability of legal services or seri-
ously increase the cost of those services. Thus, whether a given standard best
serves the purposes of lawyer licensing depends upon the validity of the stan-
dard, its impact on the cost and availability of legal services, and its demo-
graphic impact on the bar. In the sections that follow, this article will
explore these questions in relation to each of the central criteria for bar ad-
mission: character and fitness, education, testing, and legal experience.
B. THE RELATION OF STANDARDS TO CRITERIA
1. General Concerns
The criteria for bar admission, as developed in the preceding section, con-
stitute those qualifications regarded as relevant to the admissibility of a bar
applicant. The generally recognized standards are character and fitness, edu-
cation, testing, legal experience, and willingness to take an oath.
37
Each criterion is applied in each state under a set of standards. These
standards constitute the norms against which the acceptability of an appli-
cant's qualifications are measured. Standards for admission are largely a
matter of state sovereignty. 38 Nevertheless, certain national practices and
standards have evolved with respect to each of the criteria and many states
have elected to follow some or all of those practices and standards.
The national bar admission debate, as a question of uniform standards,
comes into clearer focus if we undertake the following analysis. Initially, we
should consider each criterion for bar admission in light of the justifications
for lawyer licensing. Secondly, we should identify any national standards for
applying that criterion. Thirdly, we should identify the diverse state stan-
dards for applying the criterion. Finally, we should assess the degree to
37. Although an oath is usually required, it is not one of the criteria carefully discussed here
because it generates so little discussion and disagreement in bar admission circles. It is interesting
to speculate on the reasons for this lack of attention. Perhaps, a belief in the indeterminacy of
language accounts for applicants' general willingness to take oaths. Or perhaps, bar admission
authorities place so little stock in oaths that an applicant's refusal meets no official resistance.
38. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) ("Since the founding of the Republic, the licens-
ing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia
within their respective jurisdictions.").
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which the purposes for lawyer licensing are best served by applying state or
national standards to the criterion.
2. Character and Fitness
a) Substantive Standards
All states require as a condition of admission that an applicant meet mini-
mal requirements of good character and fitness for law practice. A series of
United States Supreme Court decisions have set first and fourteenth amend-
ment limits beyond which states may not go in denying admission on charac-
ter and fitness grounds.39 Generally stated, pre-admission conduct will not
provide a basis for denying bar admission unless that conduct has a "rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." 4
Federal constitutional standards, of course, supply the ultimate national
standards when it comes to bar admission. As to the character and fitness
criterion, the constitutional requirement of "a rational connection" with "fit-
ness to practice law" still allows states enormous discretion in setting their
own standards. Constitutional requirements, however, are not the only
source of meaningful national standards.
The best way to bring coherence to the character and fitness requirement is
to view it within the context of rules governing the professional conduct of
licensed lawyers. 41 Simply stated, bar admission decisions and lawyer disci-
pline decisions should be consistent. Misconduct that would keep a new law-
yer out, should remove an already licensed lawyer from the bar, all things
being otherwise equal. This position is compelling because the justifications
for lawyer licensing apply across the board; they cannot logically support one
set of rules for bar applicants and another set of rules for licensed lawyers,
based solely on whether a person has crossed the threshold of admission to
the bar.
The great majority of states have adopted either the American Bar Associ-
ation Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the American Bar Associ-
ation Model Rules of Professional Conduct as the law governing the conduct
of licensed lawyers in their state, subject perhaps to a few local amend-
ments. 42 Because character and fitness standards should be logical exten-
sions of the rules governing licensed lawyers, the national legal ethics codes
39. Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
40. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
41. For a more elaborate presentation of this argument see McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of
the Good Moral Character Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (1984).
For an account of the ways in which coherence is lacking in the character and fitness area, see
Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L. J. 491 (1985).
42. See O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 16 SETON HALL 678
(1986) (explores points of divergence in state ethics rules).
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should provide the major substance of those standards. Thus, the character
and fitness criterion should be applied, for the most part, under national
standards either imposed by the United States Constitution or as embodied
in the American Bar Association's regulatory codes.
Courts are often superficial when expressing the rationale behind character
and fitness decisions. For this and other reasons, the law of character and
fitness is marked more by rhetorical flourish than by painstaking analysis.
As the law regulating lawyers is increasingly seen to be law rather than intui-
tive ethics, the tendency toward rhetorical, rather than rational, explanations
for these decisions may diminish. Any shift toward analytical decision-mak-
ing should tend to further "nationalize" standards in the character and fit-
ness area.
b) Decision-Making Process
Character and fitness paperwork is cumbersome and time consuming. It
consists of expansive questioning of the applicant and verifications of many
types of information from many sources. For the lawyer seeking multiple
admissions, centralizing the process appears attractive for the sake of effi-
ciency alone. In fact, some centralization does occur through the investiga-
tive functions performed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
Since 1934, the Conference has furnished confidential character reports on
attorneys leaving one state and seeking admission to the bar of another.43 In
the 1978-79 fiscal year ending April 30, 1979, investigations were requested
for more than seven thousand attorneys in forty-four jurisdictions.44 More
than 200,000 investigative inquiries concerning attorneys are mailed by the
Conference each year.45 After completing an investigation requested by a
state, the Conference issues a report to that state's bar admission authority.
In its official handbook, the Conference describes its character reports:
The Conference makes no recommendations and gives no opinions in its
reports. It does refer to facts or statements pertinent to the candidate's
qualifications, it sometimes poses a question on certain lines in order to
clarify or amplify information disclosed in the report. Discrepancies be-
tween the applicant's statements and the data in the report are carefully
noted.4 6
States make the final decision concerning whether an applicant meets char-
acter and fitness standards. For experienced lawyers who are investigated by
the Conference, however, the decision will be substantially influenced by
43. NATIONAL CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, 170 -78 (S.
Duhl ed., 2d ed. 1980).
44. Id. at 170.
45. Id. at 173.
46. Id. at 174.
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what the Conference chooses to investigate, what leads it pursues, and how
its findings are presented. Thus, for many bar applicants, not only is the
character and fitness criterion applied under primarily national standards,
but it is applied by a state working in close conjunction with an independent
national agency. For many bar applicants, therefore, the character and fit-
ness criterion is already substantially national. Because of this nationalized
system, economies of scale may permit better investigations at a lower cost.
Moreover, redundant investigations can be avoided when admission is con-
currently sought in two or more jurisdictions.
Despite these apparent benefits, there are significant disadvantages. The
first disadvantage relates to the privacy interests of bar applicants. Character
and fitness investigations can lay bare a person's history. The National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners' questionnaire, completed by the bar applicants
themselves, consumes eight full pages, as reproduced in the Conference's
Handbook.4 7 The Conference also requires the applicant to complete an Au-
thorization and Release that authorizes every person, firm, and governmental
agency to provide any documents, records, or other information pertaining
to the applicant. 48 Furthermore, the document releases all providers and re-
cipients of information from any form of liability arising out of the investiga-
tion. 49 It is difficult to imagine a more sweeping waiver of rights relating to
information and reputation. Moreover, it should be remembered that this
waiver is compelled upon pain of being denied the opportunity to practice
the applicant's chosen profession.
A substantial body of literature discusses the privacy interest in controlling
the dissemination of information about oneself.50 Difficult issues arise in this
context, and categorical solutions to these issues are usually more rigid than
wise. Nevertheless, it would be folly to ignore the threats to personal privacy
and to an independent bar occasioned by the centralized storage of highly
probing and personal information about lawyers. The specter of these
threats is not futuristic fiction; it is historical fact. From 1936 until 1976, the
National Conference of Bar Examiners and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion enjoyed what one document suggests was an "extremely cooperative"
relationship involving the secret sharing of information about lawyers. 51 In
47. Id. at 146-53.
48. Id. at 171-72.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Blous-
tein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962
(1964); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a more current treatment, see Wiseman, Invasion by Polygraph: An
Assessment of Constitutional and Common Law Parameters, 32 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 27 (1987). For an
economic analysis, see R. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231-309 (1983).
51. Nat'l L.J., June 24, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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particular, the shared information included reports on lawyers' political be-
liefs and associations and whether they handled civil rights cases. A nation-
ally centralized character and fitness process is more susceptible to this kind
of potentially dangerous abuse. In this respect, state-based investigations and
decisions are preferable, if only because the impact of any abuse is reduced.
In addition to the issues of privacy and politics, the state-based system
permits an appropriate divergence of state approaches on policy matters.
Character and fitness standards, even if they are derived from the ABA
Model Code or Model Rules, may certainly be applied in different (and con-
tradictory) ways to a given case at hand. Bar admission decisions involve-a
balance between protecting the public from a potentially high-risk practi-
tioner and giving a lawyer a chance to prove herself on the job. With respect
to character and fitness cases, this balance may involve an assessment of
whether the applicant's misconduct was isolated or typical, or whether reha-
bilitation has occurred. One state may tend to be more protective of its citi-
zens against potential wrongdoers while another state may tend more toward
protection of the individual's interest in pursuing a chosen occupation. Con-
sistency among states in this respect does not seem a desirable objective in its
own right.
c) Summary
Because of its risks to privacy and its potential for abuse, a nationalized
system of character and fitness investigations and decisions is particularly
worrisome. The state-based system is preferable not only because of privacy
risks, but also because of the appropriate discretion it leaves to states to de-
termine the balance between applicants' interests and the public's interests.
It must be noted, however, that because licensed lawyers and bar applicants
should be treated consistently, and because licensed lawyers are governed by
rules generally uniform throughout the states, the character and fitness crite-
rion should generally be applied under standards that are agreed upon
nationally. 52
3. Education
The education criterion for bar admission, more than any other criterion,
implements the goal of leading lawyers to a higher level of competence and
professionalism, i.e. the positive justification for lawyer licensing. In addi-
52. This uniformity is not only the product of widespread adoption of ABA promulgated stan-
dards governing the conduct of lawyers. In addition, standards governing character and fitness
requirements for bar admission have been jointly promulgated by the Association of American Law
Schools, the American Bar Association, and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. See
Moeser, Amendments to Code of Recommended Standardsfor Bar Examiners, 56 BAR EXAMINER,
May 1987, at 22, 23.
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tion, the education criterion, in some of its applications, provides evidence of
minimal technical proficiency. Thus, it also furthers the defensive justifica-
tions for lawyer licensing, that is, protecting future clients and the adminis-
tration of justice.
The education criterion is applied through requirements as to both legal
and pre-legal education. Every state's education requirements may be satis-
fied by completing the first professional degree in law from a law school ap-
proved by the American Bar Association. 53 Some states, however, vary from
the national standard, permitting admission based upon law office study or
study at a law school not approved by the ABA. The national standard,
then, is to require a degree from an ABA-approved law school. The majority
of states apply the national standard to all bar applicants. 54
States may vary from the national standard of an ABA-approved degree
either by imposing educational requirements in addition to the ABA-ap-
proved degree requirement or by allowing admission without an ABA-ap-
proved degree. Variations from the national education standard provide
excellent cases-in-point for the national bar admission debate.
a) Additional Requirements
Additional education requirements beyond an ABA-approved degree typi-
cally consist of specific law school course requirements or completion of a
bridge-the-gap course in the state.55 South Carolina's Rule 5, for example,
includes both types of additional requirements. Under the South Carolina
rule, bar applicants must have taken courses in fourteen specified subjects,
including equity, taxation, trial advocacy and domestic relations.5 6 The justi-
fication for the rule is that these subjects involve "areas of the law into which
[South Carolina lawyers] will most likely be thrown". 57 In addition, South
Carolina bar applicants must successfully complete a bridge-the-gap course
approved by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a state may properly exclude from law
practice persons unfamiliar with areas of the law which they are likely to
encounter in practice. This policy may better protect clients and the admin-
istration of justice. The question is, however, whether this policy is well
served in states like South Carolina by specific law school and bridge-the-gap
course requirements which are imposed on applicants.
53. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 8-9. See also Approval of Law Schools: Amer-
ican Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure Standard 502(a) (1983) (requiring receipt of
a bachelor's degree or three-fourths of the work toward a bachelor's degree as a condition of
admission).
54. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 8-12.
55. Id. at 11.
56. S.C. Sup. CT. R. EXAM. & ADM. PRAC. LAW Rule 5A(5) (1988).
57. Littlejohn, South Carolina's Rule 5 Works Well, 54 BAR EXAMINER Aug. 1985, at 19, 21.
[Vol. 3:533
BAR ADMISSION
The answer may depend on whether the purpose of the courses is skills
training or the assimilation of valuable information. 58 The extent of an appli-
cant's knowledge in a particular legal field is better determined by testing for
that knowledge than by requiring the applicant to take a course. Education
requirements are generally ill-suited to assuring that a person possesses a
specific compendium of information. 59 In that respect, education require-
ments are inefficient; independent reading followed by testing is better suited
to the goal. Furthermore, unless the specific course content is prescribed,
there is no assurance that the course will convey the desired information to
its students. On the other hand, if the purpose of the course is skills training
rather than the assimilation of particular information, an education require-
ment may be appropriate. Skills training is extremely expensive to test,6° and
practice skills cannot be effectively self-taught. Thus, course requirements, if
skills oriented, may be an appropriate adjunct to the national education stan-
dard of a degree from an ABA-approved law school.
The question remains whether additional education requirements, involv-
ing skills-oriented law school or bridge-the-gap courses, are worth the effort
they require. Law school course requirements can seriously interfere with a
person's ability to practice a chosen profession in a chosen locale. In effect,
they may require a bar applicant to choose a state for bar admission more
than a year in advance of seeking that admission in order that the additional
course requirements can be satisfied. The necessity for advanced planning
imposes not only a required waiting period but perhaps additional cost.
Bridge-the-gap courses can suffer from similar flaws. They are usually less
burdensome than specific law school courses in that they entail more modest
time demands. On the other hand, they can be more burdensome because
they often require the applicant to be physically present at the particular site
and time at which the course is conducted. Thus, depending upon the cost
and logistics of a bridge-the-gap course, it too may or may not be worth the
effort it requires. All impediments to bar admission limit opportunities to
practice law, often with a disparate impact upon minorities and women. It is
with this concern in mind that the cost/benefit analysis must be made.
58. This distinction is not always clear-cut. Skills training in legal education generally refers to
instruction in certain practical tasks, such as interviewing, counseling, and negotiation. This em-
phasis is to be distinguished from an emphasis on legal doctrine and policy analysis.
59. But see E.D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY (1987). Professor Hirsch's information-
based theory of education praises information over critical thinking, at least in certain respects:
"The superficiality of the knowledge we need for reading and writing may be unwelcome news to
those who deplore superficial learning and praise critical thinking over mere information." Id. at
15.
60. The performance test on the California bar examination experimented with tests of oral skills
but found that costs were too high. See Panel Discussion, Performance Testing: A Valuable New
Dimension or a Waste of Time and Money?, 52 BAR EXAMINER Nov. 1983, at 12, 16.
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In summary, education requirements that add local standards to the na-
tional standard of requiring a degree from an ABA-approved law school may
serve the legitimate purposes of lawyer licensing, depending upon how well
the standards meet their goals and how burdensome the standards are to
applicants. Under this balancing approach, local standards establishing spe-
cific law school and bridge-the-gap course requirements are most likely to be
justified if they are skills-oriented and are reasonable in terms of availability,
cost, and logistics.
b) Reduced Requirements
Local standards relating to the education criterion sometimes depart from
national standards by permitting admission of applicants not possessing
ABA-approved degrees. Lower education requirements61 increase access to
the bar at some sacrifice to the benefits of a formal legal education. Formal
legal study may improve a student's competence and professionalism in the
ways described in Part II. When education requirements are reduced, the
positive purposes of lawyer licensing are compromised, and there is less rea-
son to believe that lawyers are as competent and professional as their natural
talents and interests would allow them to be. In this sense, a reduction in
education requirements will reduce the quality of the legal profession. Such
reduced requirements, however, also tend to increase access to the profes-
sion. States currently must strike their own balance between the quality of
the legal profession and access to the profession.
This compromise on the quality of the profession may be more appropriate
in some states than in others. In a state that has no law school62 or no public
law school, law office study as a substitute for formal legal education may be
especially appropriate. Similarly, a state that has a law school unapproved
by the ABA may determine that the school is of sufficient quality that its
degree should be honored for purposes of bar admission. In these cases, local
circumstances may well justify local education standards that represent more
modest goals than the national education standard of an ABA-approved
degree.
California, with its lax education standards and high failure rate on the bar
61. It is possible for a state not to require an ABA approved law degree but, at the same time, to
have the same or "higher" education requirements. The question in all cases is what educational
background will meet the requirement. Certainly, the acceptance of some foreign (i.e., non-Ameri-
can) law degrees would not necessarily signal a reduction in requirements; the opposite could be
true. For present purposes, it is assumed that if an ABA approved degree is not required, the
standards are lower. This is, of course, an important and troublesome assumption, but one that
must await defense at another time.
62. States such as Alaska, Nevada and Rhode Island.
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examination, 63 merits special attention as a state with reduced education re-
quirements. California has sixteen ABA-approved law schools, enrolling
more than ten thousand law students." In a geographically large and very
populous state, this may not reasonably meet the local demand for legal edu-
cation at an ABA-approved school. What is interesting to note is the form of
trade-off made in California: education as a criterion for bar admission is
minimized and testing as a criterion is given enormous weight. While access
is broadened in California under a lax education criterion, it is harshly re-
stricted by setting a high passing score on the bar examination.
Although testing may serve the positive justification of lawyer licensing in
improving the competence and professionalism of lawyers, 65 it does so to a
far lesser degree than rigorous education requirements. Thus, in substituting
a higher testing requirement for the education requirement, California may
sacrifice the positive justification for lawyer licensing. Nor can there be com-
pensation, in kind, by raising the required passing score on the bar
examination.
The net effect of California's approach, i.e., reducing education standards
while increasing testing standards in California's bar examination, serves the
defensive purposes of lawyer licensing far more than the positive purposes, at
least in comparison to other states. In addition, access to the profession is
increased in some respects but decreased in others. In respect to licensing's
positive purpose of improving the competence and professionalism of lawyers
as a whole, there is a net loss.
c) Summary
Most states apply the education criterion under the national standard of
requiring a degree from an ABA-approved law school. Local standards may
provide reduced requirements, by not requiring an ABA-approved degree, or
additional requirements, such as specific required law school courses or
bridge-the-gap courses. Local standards providing reduced requirements
generally compromise the lawyer licensing goal of improving the competence
and professionalism of the bar as a whole. This compromise may be more
appropriate in some states than in others, depending on such factors as the
degree of access to in-state law schools approved by the ABA. Local stan-
dards providing additional requirements beyond an ABA-approved degree
may be appropriate if they are well-suited to their objectives and are not
unduly burdensome on applicants. Thus, variations from the national norm
63. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 8; 1988 Bar Examination Statistics, 58 BAR
EXAMINER 17-27.
64. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 1988-89
36-37 (1988).
65. See discussion in section III(B)(3)(c).
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can be justified even with respect to what is probably the most honored na-
tional bar admission standard, the requirement of a degree from an ABA-
approved law school.
4. Testing
Bar examinations are used in all states to measure competence to practice
law. Testing can serve the defensive purposes of lawyer licensing by identify-
ing bar applicants whose ignorance about the law would make them a risk to
future clients and to the administration of justice. In addition, testing serves
the positive purpose of lawyer licensing because preparing for the bar exami-
nation can improve familiarity with legal principles. Also, some lawyers
credit preparation for the bar examination with giving them an overview of
the law, something they did not obtain in law school. In these respects, a
lawyer's competence and professionalism are potentially improved.
a) The Role of National Tests
Every state devises and administers its own essay examination. Three
states (Indiana, Iowa and Washington) rely exclusively on their local essay
examinations in testing for bar admission. One state (Louisiana) relies solely
on its local essay examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE). Eighteen states use both their own local essay exami-
nation and the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE).66 Twenty-eight states
use their own local essay examination, in addition to the MBE and the
MPRE. 67 Thus, every state's bar examination has some local content, and
almost every state's bar examination has some national content.
The trend is clearly toward giving the national examinations greater
weight in the bar admission process. In most states, the percentage of the bar
examination devoted to local content decreases as new national examinations
are added to a state's requirements. With the first administration of the Mul-
tistate Essay Examination (MEE) in 1988, it seems likely that participating
states will further reduce the amount of examining time devoted to the local
essay examination, probably down to one-half day out of two or more days.
The general purpose of the bar examination is to assess an applicant's abil-
ity to legally analyze a factual problem. Standard 16 of the Code of Recom-
mended Standards for Bar Examiners identifies the purpose of the
examination as follows:
The bar examination should test the ability of an applicant to identify legal
issues in a statement of facts, such as may be encountered in the practice of
law, to present a reasoned analysis of the issues and to arrive at a logical




solution by the application of fundamental legal principles, in a manner
which demonstrates a thorough understanding of such principles. The ex-
amination should not be designed primarily to test information, memory or
experience.
6 8
Standard 17 recognizes the value of including within the local essay examina-
tion "subjects of substantial local importance," but cautions that the exami-
nation should emphasize "basic and fundamental" subjects.6 9
These national standards appropriately minimize the importance of partic-
ular legal rules and emphasize broader intellectual skills. Nevertheless, most
applicants prepare for the bar examination by intensely studying legal rules.
Moreover, accurate recall of legal rules seems to be a substantial portion of
what is tested, particularly on the national examinations.
For example, consider this sample question from materials describing the
MPRE:
Attorney is defending Client, who has been indicted for burglary. During
an interview, Client stated to Attorney that Client had committed perjury
while testifying before the grand jury that indicted him.
Attorney is subject to discipline if she:
A. Continues to represent Client.
B. Continues to represent Client unless Client admits his perjury.
C. Does not inform the authorities of the perjury.
D. Informs the authorities of the perjury.70
The correct answer is listed as D. 71 If Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were changed to permit a lawyer to disclose confiden-
tial information to rectify a client's perjured testimony, the correct answer to
the above question would not be D. Whether an applicant answers correctly
depends upon the accuracy of the applicant's xecall of the confidentiality
rule. The question requires no issue recognition and little reasoned analysis,
the skills that bar examinations should require according to Standard 16. In
fact, the question largely tests information and memory, in direct contraven-
tion of the purpose of bar examinations identified in Standard 16. It should
be noted that this question is described as similar to those generally asked on
the MPRE and, judging from the other sample questions, this seems to be the
68. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 206. The Code of Recommended Stan-
dards for Bar Examiners was jointly adopted by the American Bar Association, the Association of
American Law Schools, and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. Revisions to the Code,
concerning character and fitness standards, have recently been approved. See Moeser, supra note
52, at 22, 23.
69. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 210.
70. NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAM., MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION
INFORMATION BOOKLET 24 (1986).
71. Id. at 37.
1990]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
case.72
The shortcomings of the national examinations in fulfilling the purpose of
bar examinations as expressed in the national standards are probably ex-
plained by the National Conference's commitment to psychometrically
sound testing.73 In recent years, prompted by the widespread adoption of the
Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), bar examiners have discovered the con-
cept of psychometric reliability. The Bar Examiner's Handbook defines "re-
liability" in the following terms:
Reliability is a statistical concept referring to the extent to which an ob-
served grade for a given candidate corresponds to the grade which most
truly represents his ability. In an examination, his observed grade can only
approximate his true grade because no single examination can cover the
field exhaustively and the candidate's condition at any one examination
may not permit him to do his best. In addition to these sources of reliabil-
ity which affect both objective and essay examinations, there is another
one, stemming from the use of graders, which affects only essay examina-
tions. Where multiple graders are used they probably don't agree perfectly
among themselves as to grading standards and in any one grader his stan-
dards may fluctuate somewhat with time. A candidate's grade will there-
fore depend to some extent on who grades his paper and when it is
graded.74
The message is that objective examinations are more reliable than essay ex-
aminations in that they permit more accurate assessments of how examinees
perform relative to one another.
According to a past chairman of the National Conference of Bar Examin-
ers, the relative unreliability of essay examinations ought "to scare the bejab-
bers out of [bar examiners]." ' 75 And to a great extent it has. Concern about
the reliability of bar examinations, especially the essay component, has
prompted new methods of grading examinations. The net result of this new
methodology is that objective examinations, and the MBE in particular, are
the touchstones of the grading process in many jurisdictions. Essay scores
are adjusted to fit the MBE curve, and decisions as to who passes are dictated
in large part by the perceived strength of each year's examinee pool, as mea-
sured by the MBE.76
72. Id. at 21.
73. Webster's Dictionary defines "psychometric" as "(1) relating to the measurement of mental or
subjective data; (2) relating to or being a mental test or psychological method whose results are
expressed quantitatively rather than qualitatively." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged 1961).
74. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 227.
75. 43 BAR EXAMINER 135 (1979) (transcript of John Germany's introduction of Dr. Stephen
Klein at 1979 Annual Meeting of NCBE in Dallas).
76. Many states choose to follow this methodology. See Klein, IV Essay Grading: Fictions,
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The drive for an increasingly reliable and psychometrically sound bar ex-
amination has serious implications. As the reliability of the bar examination
improves, the validity of the examination may decline. The validity of a test
is the extent to which it measures what it sets out to measure. The most
valid bar examination would measure a wide array of knowledge and skills
important in law practice, so that it would best determine who was qualified
for law practice. Great discretion and subjectivity are required to assess an
applicant's broad-based qualifications. Discretion and subjectivity in assess-
ing performances on a test usually dictate psychometric unreliability. By
stressing reliability, the bar examination is virtually doomed to a low level of
validity.
Moreover, the dominant commitment to psychometrically reliable testing
leads to a nationalized examining process, a result already largely achieved.
At present, the last bastion of state testing and grading is the essay portion of
bar examinations. With the development of the Multistate Essay Examina-
tion (MEE) by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, however, this last
bastion of state testing has been breached. The MEE was first administered
in participating states as part of the July 1988 bar examination, as a comple-
ment to the National Conference's MBE and the Multistate Professional Re-
sponsibility Examination.
The national examinations are technically reliable and technically sound.
They have led bar examiners out of the dark ages of testing, in which bar
examination results were skewed in unintended ways. 77 Moreover, they have
increased the fairness and consistency of bar examinations and have gener-
ally led to improved production values in all phases of constructing, adminis-
tering and grading the examination, including the local essay portion.
At the same time, the national examinations tend to make bar admission
more technocratic and mechanical. They encourage the systematic elimina-
tion of independent professional judgments about the exhibited competence
of bar examinees. Examinee performances are lost in a reductionist
nightmare of data. Each examinee's answers are studied as trees, and no one
looks at the forest of an examinee's total performance.
In some states this result is unavoidable. The sheer number of examinees
in those states requires a bureaucratic assessment of examination perform-
ance. Just because the numbers game is necessary in some states, however,
does not make it ideal in every state.
The national examinations, with their high production values and high
reliability, make an enormous contribution to sound bar admission testing.
Facts and Forecasts, 53 BAR EXAMINER Aug. 1985, at 23, 29; Klein, IV Establishing Pass/Fail
Standards, 55 BAR EXAMINER Aug. 1986, at 18, 24.
77. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 271-302.
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Most states wisely choose to include at least one national examination in
their testing program. States with many examinees may have no choice but
to construct their testing program with the national examinations as the
center point. But other states, because of smaller volume or relatively greater
resources, may wish to make independent professional judgments about each
examinee in deciding whether or not the examinee should be passed. Any
such process will be "unreliable," in the psychometric sense, but it may be
superior to testing strictly by the numbers.7 8
The national tests are dominant in some states because the local essay ex-
amination is given less time and weight and because the grading process,
especially the curving of grades, depends so heavily upon examinee perform-
ances on the MBE. Thus, national tests threaten to pre-empt bar admission
testing in terms of content and grading, and, in some respects, have done so
already. 79
b) The Role of Local Tests
Standard 17b of the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners
provides that "subjects of substantial local importance" may be included on
the bar examination. Standard 18 provides that the bar examination should
include essay questions in assessing whether an examinee is qualified to be
licensed as a lawyer. Moreover, they recognize that knowing enough law to
practice in a given state may require knowledge of some idiosyncratic local
law.8 0
With the inauguration of the MEE in 1988, local tests no longer are the
only alternative for essay testing. Thus, with a national essay test, local essay
examinations must find their justification in some rationale beyond the gen-
eral benefits of essay testing. The National Conference will probably produce
a very good national essay examination, thus causing many to question the
purpose of local essay examinations.
The local essay examination requires an applicant to submit to a local test
in the admitting jurisdiction under a usually rigid time frame. The local es-
say examination is the greatest single reason for the heavy cost in time and
money exacted by the state-based system of bar admission. Most bar admis-
sion restraints on lawyer mobility are easily solved. National test scores
should be readily transferable, though some states, for less than compelling
reasons, do not allow it. Character and fitness assessments can be continu-
78. See Lenel, Choosing a Standard: The Nedelsky and Angoff Methods, 58 BAR EXAMINER,
Feb. 1989, at 23.
79. THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 224.
80. Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed this idea quite forcefully: "Certain aspects of legal
practice are distinctly and intentionally nonnational." Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,
470 U.S. 274, 292 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ous, unlike the twice a year schedule for bar examinations. National educa-
tion standards, once met, are met for all time and in all places. Citizenship
and residence requirements, now largely eradicated, 8' no longer restrain law-
yer mobility. Thus, one of the major restraints that remains is the local essay
examination.
Given Standard 17, it may seem easiest to justify local essay examinations
because of their ability to test examinee familiarity with "subjects of substan-
tial local importance." This justification can be extended under Standard 18,
which approves questions "in subjects with respect to which local variations
are highly significant." The essence of this argument is that a qualified law-
yer should know particularly significant local law. The purposes of lawyer
licensing are clearly served by requiring lawyers to demonstrate minimal fa-
miliarity with fundamentally important legal principles, whether those prin-
ciples are nationally recognized or only locally recognized.
But the role of local essay examinations is much greater than simply certi-
fying minimal knowledge of fundamentally important local law. Local test-
ing provides state bar examiners with the information they need to decide
who should be admitted and who should not.
The process of sorting out a sea of data from the examination provides
little insight into which examinee performances should be judged adequate
and which insufficient. Unless bar examiners become involved in the con-
struction and grading of some portion of the bar examination, they are forced
to make highly abstract and largely uninformed decisions about who receives
a license to practice law. They have no clear sense of how good or how bad
examinees are and no clear sense of whose interests they serve or disserve in
their bar admission decisions.
When bar examiners are immersed in the process of constructing and
grading some portion of the bar examination, they develop a basis for arriv-
ing at an informed professional judgment about which examinees should pass
and which should not. By drafting or reviewing a state essay question, bar
examiners can better appreciate how questions can mislead and how criti-
cally important it is to know a variety of legal rules, notwithstanding the
admonition of Standard 16, i.e., bar examinations should not primarily test
for information or memory. In reading state essay answers, bar examiners
can hear the voices of examinees as they express certainty and confusion,
approval and disgust, simple-mindedness and complex understanding. After
confronting the questions and the concerns that naturally arise in construct-
ing and grading state essay questions, bar examination data take on new life.
The drawing of pass/fail lines becomes less mechanical, more informed,
81. See supra note 8; see also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (exclusion of resident aliens
from practice of law violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
1990]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
more intelligently judgmental. The balance can be more thoughtfully struck
among protecting the public, allowing applicants to practice their chosen oc-
cupation and requiring that applicants experience educational challenges that
will not just minimally equip them to practice but better equip them as
well.82
Thus, the state essay examination is necessary in that it enables state bar
examiners to make informed professional judgments about who should pass
the bar examination and who should not. As long as state bar examiners
make the pass/fail decision, the state essay examination is extremely impor-
tant. A secondary reason for state testing is to determine whether examinees
are adequately familiar with fundamentally important local law.8 3
c) The Pass/Fail Decision
The primary justification for state testing is that it enables state bar exam-
iners to make informed professional judgments about who should be licensed
in their states. If pass/fail decisions were made according to a national
norm, the primary justification for state testing would vanish. Thus, it is
important to determine whether there are significant reasons for states to set
their own local standards for who passes the bar examination and who does
not.
States differ as to how high or low they set their passing scores on their bar
examinations. For example, in Nebraska, a scaled score of 125 on the MBE
is considered passing, while in Vermont, a scaled score of 137 is required.8 4
If passing scores were agreed upon under some national standard, local test-
ing might no longer be necessary.
There are significant reasons, however, for the pass/fail decision to be
made under local standards. Local standards governing eligibility to take the
bar examination vary, most notably with respect to the education require-
ments imposed. It comes as no surprise that three of the four states which
passed fewer than sixty percent of all of their 1988 bar examinees are states
that do not require a law degree from an ABA-approved law school.8 5
Moreover, demographic differences could lead to different pass/fail stan-
dards. For example, the two most populous states, California and New
York, have relatively low passing percentages on their bar examinations. 86
82. See Lenel, supra note 77.
83. The same analysis applies to non-objective state tests other than essay examinations, such as
"performance tests" in California.
84. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 20-21.
85. Id. at 8-9; 1988 Bar Admission Statistics, 58 BAR EXAMINER May 1989, at 17-19. The states
are Alabama, California, Delaware (ABA-approved law degree required), and Vermont.
86. 1988 Bar Admission Statistics, 58 BAR EXAMINER May 1989, at 17-19 (California had a
passage rate of 49.8% and New York had a passage rate of 60.2%).
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The number and quality of law schools in a state may play a role as well in
determining how high or low the passing score should be set.
The establishment of a national passing score requires significant com-
promises. How can California reduce its passing score when it permits per-
sons with little formal legal education to take its examination? Why should
Mississippi increase its passing score when its experience is that the public is
now adequately protected? A national passing score on a national test would
in many states shift the balance between access to the profession and the risk
to the public. A national passing score would have radically different effects
in different states. In some states, access to the profession and risk to the
public would be decreased; in other states, the opposite would be true.
d) Summary
National tests such as the MBE make important contributions to bar ad-
mission testing by increasing the sophistication and reliability of bar exami-
nations. Nevertheless, local tests remain important because they alone
provide bar examiners with the necessary basis for making pass/fail deci-
sions. The value of local tests, however, does not require that all applicants
take them. For example, testing requirements could be waived for some ap-
plicants, particularly under motion admission rules, without destroying the
value of either local or national tests.
5. Legal Experience
Many states impose legal experience requirements either as a substitute for
some or all of the testing requirements or as an additional requirement.
Legal experience requirements potentially serve both the defensive and posi-
tive purposes of lawyer licensing. Thus, for example, a period of active law
practice without reported incidents of misconduct or malpractice provides
some evidence that a lawyer is not a serious risk to clients or to the adminis-
tration of justice. Moreover, legal experience tends to improve a lawyer's
competence and, perhaps, professionalism. In these respects, legal experi-
ence as a bar admission criterion generally fits within the purposes of lawyer
licensing.
a) Legal Experience as a Substitute Requirement: Motion Admission
Legal experience as a bar admission criterion usually operates in states
allowing admission on motion, where legal experience substitutes for some or
all of the testing requirement. Over half of the states allow admission on
motion in some cases.8 7 Among the factors that can be relevant are the na-
ture of the applicant's legal experience, whether the applicant was licensed to
87. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 28-35.
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practice law in the place and at the time the experience was gained, and the
period of time involved. These factors can be crucial in determining whether
the legal experience requirement actually serves the purposes of lawyer li-
censing, because they determine whether the experience has substance.
Legal experience requirements vary dramatically. At one extreme, the
District of Columbia permits admission on motion by any applicant who has
been an active member in good standing in a state bar for the five years
preceding application,8 8 even if during those five years the applicant was
working in a shoe store and did nothing law-related. Moreover, the rule
imposes no education requirement. Thus, any person admitted on any basis
in any state qualifies after five years for admission without testing in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
The District of Columbia rule obviously fosters a highly mobile bar, an
objective especially appropriate to the District. It requires nothing more
than a state's determination, once upon a time, that the applicant was quali-
fied to practice there. Moreover, the District of Columbia's requirement of
active membership in good standing for five years seems to require only that
the applicant had the interest and wherewithal to pay annual licensing fees or
bar dues for a period of time. Thus, the District's motion admission rule
operates like most federal bar admission rules in deferring wholesale to the
standards of another jurisdiction.
At the opposite extreme, the recently abrogated Illinois rule for motion
admission required a law degree from an ABA-approved law school, a pass-
ing score on the MPRE, residence at the time of practice in the state from
which admission is sought, and continuous and active law practice in that
state for five of the seven years preceding application. 89 In addition, the ap-
88. D.C. Cr. App. R. 46(c)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Admission requirements. Any person may, upon proof of good moral character as it
relates to the practice of law, be admitted to the Bar of this court without examination,
provided that such person:
(1) Has been an active member in good standing of a Bar of a court of general juris-
diction in any state or territory of the United States for a period of five years immedi-
ately preceding the filing of the application....
89. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 705 (1986) provided in pertinent part:
Any person who has been admitted to practice in the highest court of law in any other
State or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia may make applications
to the Board of Law Examiners for admission to the Bar, without academic qualification
examination, upon the following conditions:
(a) The educational qualifications of the applicant are such as would entitle him to
write the academic qualification examination in this State at the time he seeks admis-
sion, and he has resided and actively and continuously practiced law in such other
jurisdiction for a period of at least five years of the seven years immediately prior to
making the application.
(b) In the event the jurisdiction from which the applicant seeks admission requires, as
of the date of the filing of his application in this State, higher qualifications for admis-
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plicant had to be an Illinois resident to qualify under the rule. The Illinois
rule also contained a reciprocity provision that denied motion admission to
applicants from states which do not themselves permit motion admission.
Thus, the Illinois rule provided a number of standards which had to be met
in order to qualify for motion admission.
With respect to the legal experience criterion, the Illinois rule required, as
noted above, that the applicant have "resided and actively and continuously
practiced law" in the state where admitted and from which Illinois admission
was sought. This standard raises key interpretive questions:
1. What is law practice? The parameters of "law practice" are not well-
defined, especially when the practice is not the private practice of law. A
job may not qualify as "law practice" if the job description did not require
a lawyer to fill the job or if similar jobs in other organizations are held by
non-lawyers. Very probing inquiry may be necessary to determine whether
the nature of the lawyer's work qualifies as law practice.
2. What is active and continuous practice? The "active and continuous"
criterion suggests that there is a minimum standard. At some point, there-
fore, a lawyer does too little legal work to classify her practice as "active
sion in such jurisdiction on the basis of a foreign license than those set forth in this
rule, the applicant shall be required to conform to such higher qualifications in his
application for admission to the bar of Illinois. An applicant from any jurisdiction
which does not grant reciprocal admission to attorneys licensed in Illinois on the
basis of practice in this State shall not be entitled to admission under this rule.
(c) Effective on and after July 1, 1981, the applicant has written and successfully
passed the Illinois professional responsibility examination or, in the alternative, the
applicant proves to the satisfaction of the board that he or she has written and scored
a passing grade (as determined by the board) in the Multistate Professional Responsi-
bility Examination of the National Conference of Bar Examiners within five years
prior to the date of the application.
(d) Applications shall be in such form as the Board of Law Examiners shall prescribe.
Each applicant shall establish, to the satisfaction of the Board of Law Examiners,
that he is an actual resident of the State of Illinois, that he is at least 21 years of age,
of good moral character and general fitness to practice law, and that upon admission
to the bar he will actively and continuously engage in the practice of law in this
jurisdiction. The applicant shall furnish such proof of the practice requirements
under paragraph (a) as may be required by the Board of Law Examiners. Each appli-
cation shall be supported by a certificate of a judge of a court of general jurisdiction
in the jurisdiction from which the applicant seeks admission certifying that the appli-
cant has been admitted to and that at the time of making said application he is a
member in good standing of, the bar of that jurisdiction.
(e) In the event the Board of Law Examiners shall find that such applicant meets the
requirements of this rule and has received from the Committee on Character and
Fitness its certification of good moral character and general fitness to practice law,
the board shall certify to the court that such applicant is qualified for admission.
(f) An applicant who has taken and failed to pass the academic qualification exami-
nation in Illinois shall not be eligible to apply for admission on foreign license.
The new Rule 705 (adopted April 3, 1989, effective immediately) contains most of the same require-
ments, except the residence requirement has been dropped.
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and continuous," even though the nature of the work is law practice. De-
termining the extent of a lawyer's practice can be as difficult as determining
the nature of the work itself.
3. Was the practice done where admitted? When lawyers spend much of
their work time out of state, questions can arise as to whether that part of
their practice was done in the state where admitted. Questions also arise if
a lawyer works in one state and the client is located in another state. In
such situations, it is difficult to say in which state the practice of law
occurs.
Thus, the Illinois motion admission rule, like many motion admission rules,
raised questions concerning the nature, extent and location of an applicant's
law practice.
L Nature and Extent Requirements. The nature and extent of an appli-
cant's law practice clearly determine the quality of the applicant's legal expe-
rience. Moreover, as discussed earlier, legal experience is a useful criterion
for bar admission because it can establish that the lawyer is not a serious risk
to the public and because it can improve a lawyer's competence and profes-
sionalism. Experience is not a useful criterion, however, if it involves too
little law practice. Therefore, motion admission rules properly establish min-
imum standards respecting the nature and extent of law practice needed to
qualify for such admission. Since it is difficult to express these standards
clearly, however, many states define specific types of jobs as constituting law
practice. These standards, for example, may prescribe that law teaching, ser-
vice as in-house corporate counsel, or government agency service constitutes
law practice for purposes of motion admission. 90
No national standards have been developed to guide states in resolving the
many close questions as to whether a given lawyer's work satisfies standards
respecting the nature and extent of required law practice. Motion admission
applications in which the nature or extent of a given lawyer's practice is at
issue can remain on the bar admission docket almost interminably. Tax re-
turns and appointment books may be demanded, as well as letters from cli-
ents, lawyers, and judges. Office landlords may be questioned about the
regularity of a lawyer's practice. Even court records may be necessary to
prove the lawyer's active involvement in a case. Each of these rounds of
submissions takes time. The whole process is sometimes punctuated at slow
intervals by the monthly or less frequent meetings of the bar examining
board and the resulting demands for new proof of active practice. Proving
active practice can require almost full-time practice in its own right.
It is ironic that lawyer-employees of private organizations (as opposed to
law firms), probably the most mobile segment of the bar, encounter perhaps
90. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 31, at 28-29.
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the greatest difficulty in gaining admission on motion. This difficulty is often
caused by the lack of standards for determining the nature and extent of an
applicant's law practice. This irony is compounded in that lawyer-employees
of private organizations are, by the nature of their work, less of a risk to the
public than lawyers in private practice. They do not hold themselves out to
the public in an effort to attract clients and thus are less of a risk to future
clients. Moreover, their practices tend to involve more preventive law and
less direct handling of litigation than many private practices, thereby impli-
cating less often the administration of justice.
Thus, while the nature and extent of an applicant's law practice appropri-
ately bear on a lawyer's qualifications for motions admission, there are few
good standards, either national or local, by which such qualifications are
judged. It is the absence of standards on both the national and local levels
that makes motion admission so unsatisfactory to so many arguably qualified
applicants.
Because motion admission by its very nature involves interstate bar admis-
sion, motion admission standards are most appropriately developed at the
national level. It is curious that so much has been accomplished nationally
in respect to the character and fitness, education, and testing criteria, but
that legal experience for purposes of motion admission, the one essentially
interstate criterion, has been left exclusively to the states. The Code of Rec-
ommended Standards for Bar Examiners contains no provision dealing di-
rectly with motion admission, and The Bar Examiners' Handbook devotes no
text to motion admission.
ii. Location Requirements. In addition to focusing on the nature and extent
of a lawyer's practice, many states' motion admission rules are concerned
about the location of the lawyer's practice. The rationale for this concern is
that if the lawyer's practice occurs in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not
licensed, then the lawyer is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Since it is professional misconduct (and often a crime) for a lawyer to engage
in unauthorized practice, 9' it might be argued that such misconduct should
not be rewarded by admitting the lawyer on motion.
This black-and-white view of law practice ignores current realities. Many
lawyers represent clients from many states. In addition, they may apply the
91. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 3-101(B) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAl CONDUCT Rule 5.5(a) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 316 (1967)
("It is a matter of law, not of ethics, as to where an individual may practice law.... Whether a
lawyer from State I can or cannot on a trip to State II draft a contract for his State I client in State
II, or whether he can in State II conduct negotiations with another lawyer for that State I client, is
not a matter of ethics but a matter of defining what is the practice of law in State II. This must be
done by State II.").
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law of many states to a given legal matter. In a national economy (to say
nothing of an international economy), multistate law practice must occur.
Moreover, multistate law practice will occur in ways that make it impossible
for the lawyer engaging in that practice to seek and secure bar admission in
every state in which she is involved. Any ethical concern about whether a
lawyer is licensed in the locations in which the lawyer practices, therefore,
should be treated solely as an ethical concern under the character and fitness
criterion. It should not be considered in reference to the legal experience
criterion. The present practice of viewing these questions in relation to legal
experience standards rather than character and fitness standards only mud-
dies the water.
iii. Additional Concerns. Finally, two key concerns relating to motion ad-
mission remain to be addressed: first, the propriety of reciprocity rules, by
which motion admission standards vary to conform to the rules of the state
from which the applicant seeks admission; and second, the refusal of many
states to substitute legal experience for testing. In the latter case there is, of
course, no motion admission at all.
Reciprocity rules discriminate between equally qualified applicants based
on the applicants' state of original admission. This discrimination serves
neither the defensive nor positive purposes of lawyer licensing: it neither
protects the public nor improves the profession. Moreover, it strongly inti-
mates economic protectionism, an illegitimate purpose for lawyer licensing
or bar admission rules. For these reasons, reciprocity provisions are inappro-
priate to a motion admission rule.
The persistence of reciprocity provisions is an embarrassment to the pro-
fession. Consider the argument advanced by the State Bar of Wisconsin in
successfully urging the Wisconsin Supreme Court to adopt a reciprocity limi-
tation on its motion admission rule:
Although Wisconsin imposes little or no barriers to the interstate practice
of law, other states have continued to impose territorial limitations. Such
limitations significantly burden the residents of Wisconsin since, in our na-
tional economy, residents' legal problems do not necessarily follow state
boundaries. A Wisconsin attorney's inability to service his clients' legal
business in several jurisdictions necessitates duplicative work by different
attorneys and increases the cost of legal services. The proposed change for
admission on foreign license from comity to reciprocity provides the incen-
tive for other jurisdictions to adopt rules for admission similar to
Wisconsin's. 92
In other words, recognizing that Wisconsin residents are damaged by bar
92. Brief of State Bar of Wisconsin at 10, In re Amendment of SCR Chapter 40: Admission to
the State Bar, 144 Wis. 2d xiii (1988).
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admission barriers in other states, the Wisconsin State Bar proposes to inflict
equivalent damage on the residents of those other states. This eye-for-an-eye
approach is intended as an incentive for more enlightened bar admission
rules elsewhere.
A second rationale for reciprocity is advanced in the same State Bar brief:
[A]lthough attorneys from [neighboring] states can usually be admitted to
practice in Wisconsin after only three years of practice, Wisconsin attorney
[sic] cannot practice in any one of them unless they take the bar examina-
tion or meet other special conditions. 93
This rationale, protecting local lawyers from unfair competition by lawyers
from other states, is probably the more common reason for limits on motion
admission, including reciprocity provisions.
Notice that neither rationale is directed primarily at benefitting the public.
The first rationale is directed at punishing residents of recalcitrant states and
the second rationale is to protect local lawyers. Of course, neither rationale
fits within the justifications for bar admission discussed previously in the arti-
cle. Reciprocity rules are particularly offensive because they so clearly ad-
vance lawyer self-interest in the most provincial way while, at the same time,
defaulting on the profession's commitment to serve the public.
On the other hand, states that refuse to substitute legal experience for test-
ing may have sound reasons for their refusal. Most importantly, bar exami-
nations serve the purposes of lawyer licensing, and should not be waived
lightly. Moreover, sound motion admission standards have not been devel-
oped, thus making motion admission difficult to administer. Nevertheless,
states that reject motion admission should carefully consider how little they
may gain by doing so, and at what cost to the public and to the bar
applicants.
Consider how little the public stands to lose by motion admission. Most
experienced lawyers have taken the national bar tests, so by requiring such
lawyers to take their bar examinations, non-motion states are only adding the
assurance that the lawyer has not forgotten what other law she knew when
she passed her original state's bar examination. However, sound standards
respecting the nature and extent of a motion applicant's law practice experi-
ence should overcome any concern about how much the lawyer has forgot-
ten. Whether the lawyer knows fundamentally important local law could be
tested soon after admission as easily as just before, with little additional risk
to the public.
It should also be noted that the public is served by bar admission rules that
are not unduly burdensome on applicants. The market for legal services
must be regulated in many ways if the purposes of lawyer licensing are to be
93. Id. at 7-8.
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served. But over-regulation of the market increases the cost of services and
reduces their variety and availability. If a state's refusal to admit exper-
ienced lawyers on motion has no sound justification, then refusal harms the
public just as surely as any other senseless economic regulation would cause
harm.
b) Defining "Law Practice": The Relation of Motion Admission to
Unauthorized Practice
The essence of lawyer licensing and bar admission rules is to prohibit peo-
ple from practicing law. As discussed previously, "law practice" must be
defined for purposes of motion admission, because such admission usually
depends, and should depend, upon the quality of the applicant's legal experi-
ence. To qualify for motion admission in most states, applicants must estab-
lish that they were actively "practicing law." Even so, few standards have
evolved in the bar admission area to define "law practice."
On the other hand, "law practice" has been extensively defined for pur-
poses of determining whether the performance of various tasks by non-law-
yers constitutes the "unauthorized practice of law." A researcher notes the
following activity in the period 1920-1960:
The organization of the profession to combat the unauthorized practice of
law produced notable results, not the least of which was a dramatic in-
crease in discussion of the subject. In addition to the stream of articles
published in the Unauthorized Practice News (an ABA committee publica-
tion), there was a great upsurge of writing on the topic in other publica-
tions. No fewer than 24 feature articles appeared during this period in the
American Bar Association Journal. The writers in state and local bar jour-
nals and in other periodicals were even more prolific, producing at least
358 articles on the subject. Topics relating to unauthorized practice were
treated in no less than 232 law review notes, comments and feature articles.
And unauthorized practice of law was the subject of 16 annotations in the
American Law Reports.94
This extensive body of literature stirs hope that "law practice" may yet be
helpfully defined, with two significant implications: first, motion admission
standards would be more efficient and reliable; and second, lawyers would
know when licensure in a second state was necessary in order to perform
certain services in that state. Part IV of this Article addresses the second of
these concerns.
94. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neigh-
bors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 190-91 (footnotes omitted).
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c) Legal Experience as an Additional Requirement. Clerkship and Trial
Experience Requirements
Legal experience requirements have been imposed in a handful of jurisdic-
tions as an additional requirement beyond character and fitness, education
and testing requirements. In South Carolina, applicants for admission must
prove that they attended a variety of trials in South Carolina courts before
they may appear alone in the actual conduct and trial of a case.95 Some
federal district courts have also adopted requirements of this sort, notwith-
standing the federal courts' usual deference to state courts on bar admission
matters.
The historical preference for state regulation of bar admissions is based, in
part, on the fact that federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
As such, they are empowered to hear only federal criminal cases, cases
against foreign states, and civil actions involving a federal question or diver-
sity of citizenship. The result of such limited jurisdiction is that federal
courts hear less than one percent of the litigation in this country.96 More-
over, federal district courts are required to apply state substantive law in
95. S.C. Sup. CT. R. EXAM. & PRAC. LAW Rule 5B provides:
An attorney, though admitted to practice, may not appear alone in the actual conduct
and trial of a case unless and until he or she... has had at least eleven trial experiences.
A trial experience is defined as:
(1) actual participation in a full trial under the direct supervision of a member of the
Bar, or
(2) an observation of an entire contested testimonial-type hearing in a South Carolina
Tribunal.
The required trial experiences may be gained by any combination of (1) or (2) but must
include the following:
3 civil jury trials in Court of Common Pleas, or 2 in Common Pleas plus 1 in the U.S.
District Court, and
3 criminal trials in General Sessions Court, or 2 in General Sessions plus 1 in the U.S.
District Court, and
I trial in equity heard by a judge, master, or referee, and
3 trials in Family Courts, and
I trial before an industrial commissioner or other administrative officer.
The certificate shall specify by name the cases and dates and tribunals involved, attested by the
respective judges, masters or referees, or hearing officer. The Clerk's acknowledgement and ap-
proval of the certificate shall be the attorney's authority to thereafter conduct and try cases without
the supervision of a member of the Bar.
These trial experiences may be had at any time after completion of 2/3 of the credit hours needed
for law school graduation.
An attorney who has for three years practiced law in another state, and who has been admitted to
practice in South Carolina, may exempt the trial experiences required by submitting proof satisfac-
tory to the Clerk of the South Carolina Supreme Court of equivalent experience in the other state.
The provisions of Rule 5B shall apply to all persons admitted to practice after March 1, 1979.
96. Weinstein, Proper and Improper Interactions Between Bench and Law School: Law Student
Practice, Law Student Clerkships, and Rules for Admission to the Federal Bar, 50 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 441, 458 (1976).
1990]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
diversity cases, reinforcing the states' interest in regulating admission to
practice.
Despite the appeal of deference to the states in administering bar admis-
sion standards, substantial concern has been expressed over the degree of
incompetency exhibited by lawyers practicing before the federal courts. This
concern prompted then Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals to remark that many young advocates in criminal law are "walking
violations of the sixth amendment."' 97 Although most commentators have
not gone so far, they nevertheless agree that there is a need for improvement
in the quality of advocacy in the federal system. This consensus has led to
many proposals for improved federal bar admission standards.
In 1974, the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit appointed a committee
to propose changes in the rules for admission to practice in the federal
courts. The Clare Committee, as it was called, recommended that any appli-
cant for admission demonstrate that he has either participated in the prepa-
ration of four proceedings on the merits or has observed six trials. 98 This
trial experience requirement would be additional to membership in a state
bar.
Subsequently, in 1979, the Devitt Committee comprised of federal judges,
lawyers, law professors, and law students, issued its own recommendations.
Like the Clare Committee, the Devitt proposals included a requirement of
minimum trial experience which could be met by observing trials, second-
chairing a trial with a lawyer already admitted to practice, or completing a
trial advocacy course in law school. The Devitt Committee also proposed a
federal bar exam covering federal procedural rules and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, a student practice rule allowing third-year law
students to practice under a license limited in scope, and a state-wide peer
review system.99
At last count, thirteen districts have adopted special admission rules like
those proposed by the Devitt Committee.l°° Among the proposals in use are
a federal law bar examination, trial experience requirements, continuing legal
education requirements, and a system of peer review. The districts, however,
97. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
98. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice, 67
F.R.D. 159, 174 (1975).
99. Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admis-
sion to Practice in the Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 79 F.R.D.
187, 196-203 (1978).
100. Chaset, Implementing Attorney Admission Rules in the Federal Trial Courts: A Status Re-
port On King Committee Activities, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 429 (1984) (the King Committee was
appointed to help implement recommendations of the Devitt Committee). See also COMPREHEN-




have not all adopted the same requirements. Thus, while deference to the
states is being slightly curtailed, decentralization remains.
The benefits and burdens of trial experience requirements can vary greatly
from applicant to applicant. The benefits vary with the extent of the appli-
cant's prior legal experience and the quality of the proceeding which the ap-
plicant attends. The burdens vary according to whether the applicant must
travel to attend the required proceedings, whether the right type of proceed-
ings are conducted on a convenient schedule, and how long and involved the
available proceedings are.
The other form of additional legal experience requirement is a pre-admis-
sion clerkship.101 Like trial experience requirements, pre-admission clerk-
ships provide varying benefits and burdens to different applicants. In
addition, they effectively institute residence requirements, in that the clerk-
ships must be performed in the office of a locally licensed lawyer.
Both clerkship and trial experience requirements serve the purposes of
lawyer licensing. However, they suffer from two serious flaws: first, it is
difficult to control the quality of the experience; and second, there can be an
extreme burden on some applicants in effectively requiring a period of resi-
dence prior to admission. Neither of these flaws is necessarily fatal to the
usefulness of these legal experience requirements, but the need for thoughtful
implementing standards is obvious.
d) Legal Experience Summary
The legal experience criterion has much to commend it, both as a substi-
tute for testing and as an additional requirement. As a substitute require-
ment applied through motion admission rules, the criterion inherently
involves multistate bar admission and therefore should be guided by national
standards. No national standards are presently recognized, and this may
partially explain the unsatisfactory operation of motion admission rules and
the refusal of many states to adopt them.
As an additional requirement applied through trial experience or clerkship
requirements, the legal experience criterion can unduly burden some appli-
101. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 52(c), which provides:
(c) Clerkship. No person shall be admitted to the bar without having served a satisfactory
clerkship.... The 5-month period need not be continuous; however, no part of a clerk-
ship shall qualify unless it shall have been served after the applicant shall have matricu-
lated at a law school.... The Board shall prepare and furnish to any person desiring to
qualify for admission to the Bar a checklist of legal activities and practical experience to
be accomplished by the applicant during his clerkship. Prior to the admission of any
applicant as a member of the Bar both the applicant and his Preceptor shall certify to the
Board that the applicant has completed the required list of study.
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cants. The burden is great because these requirements often effectively im-
pose a pre-admission residence requirement on applicants.
C. SUMMARY
Bar admission rules are the product of both national and local standards.
In most respects, national standards have led the way toward better bar ad-
mission rules and practices. In respect to the character and fitness criterion,
national standards in the form of the American Bar Association Model Code
and Model Rules establish the substantive bases for denying admission. In
respect to the education criterion, the national standard of requiring a degree
form an ABA-approved law school has improved the quality of legal educa-
tion and, in turn, improved the quality of the bar. In respect to the testing
requirement, national standards in the form of multistate tests have produced
a sophistication and reliability that were previously lacking.
The one criterion for bar admission for which no national standards have
evolved is the legal experience criterion. As an inherently interstate criterion,
the absence of national standards is sorely felt. Many states avoid use of this
criterion altogether, and other states often use it in an ad hoc fashion.
Notwithstanding the enormous contributions of national standards, states
remain in the best position to balance the competing concerns of protecting
the public, improving the profession, allowing applicants to practice their
chosen occupation, and permitting a free, albeit regulated, market in legal
services. Local conditions can dictate variations from national standards in
bar admission. In particular, varied conditions dictate that states set their
own passing scores on the bar examination, and this, in turn, dictates that a
local essay examination be conducted. Moreover, privacy and liberty con-
cerns dictate a state-based system for character and fitness investigations and
decision-making. In developing local standards, however, states must be
careful that they do not adopt unduly burdensome requirements. Local edu-
cation and legal experience standards particularly run this risk. Unduly bur-
densome requirements not only fail to adequately serve the purposes of
lawyer licensing, they are also unfair to applicants and are a disservice to the
public.
IV. MULTISTATE PRACTICE ON A SINGLE STATE LICENSE
The proposition that lawyer licensing should be state-based establishes
only a starting point for a host of lawyer licensing issues. In particular, a
variety of policy concerns influence whether or how a state should regulate
the activities of a lawyer who is licensed in another state. This part of the
article explores some of those concerns.
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A. LAWYERING ACTIVITIES AND STATE LICENSING INTERESTS
For non-lawyers, the question of what activities are subject to lawyer regu-
lation is the ultimate question. Any activity which is within the exclusive
domain of "law practice" is, presumably, a forbidden activity as to non-law-
yers. 10 2 For out-of-state lawyers, a more complex analysis is necessary.
Most of what lawyers do professionally is "law practice,"' 0 3 and so whether
the activity qualified as "law practice" is not usually the crucial question.
Rather, the more difficult problem may involve whether the lawyer's activity
involving a second state is authorized by her license to practice in a first
state.
This issue of extra-territoriality can be analyzed initially by assessing the
ways in which a state's licensing interests may be implicated by various
forms of lawyer activity. 104 Among the relevant considerations are whether
the activity is geographically occurring within the state, whether the client is
a state resident, whether the legal matter is before the state's court or admin-
istrative system, and whether the law of the state is being or will be applied in
the matter.
1. Site of Legal Activity
Legal activity occurring within a state's borders may, but does not always,
implicate the state's licensing interest. Consider the lawyer who is licensed in
State A and who interviews a prospective expert witness in State B. If the
client is a resident of State A and the legal matter involves the law of State A
and will be tried in a State A court, none of the justifications for licensing
lawyers in State B is invoked by the lawyer's activity in interviewing the
witness, even though the activity geographically occurs in State B. Thus,
while the geographic location of the lawyer's activity may be a factor as to
whether the lawyer must be licensed in the state in which the activity occurs,
it should not constitute an independently determinative concern.
This is one of the striking respects in which the accepted realities of law
102. The limits of that domain are difficult to discern. As Professor Rhode has noted, "[a]
number of jurisdictions simply proscribe, without defining, the practice of law. Other states employ
a circularity scarcely less cryptic: The practice of law is what lawyers do." Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibi-
tions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1981).
103. In some cases, an activity is "law practice" if performed by a lawyer even though it would
not be "law practice" (or at least not the unauthorized practice of law) if performed by a non-
lawyer. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 897-98 (1986) (lawyer engaged in dual prac-
tice of law and another occupation is subject to lawyer regulation even as to activities performed as
part of the other occupation).
104. For present purposes, it is assumed that the activities referred to constitute the "practice of
law." What constitutes law practice has been variously, and usually expansively, defined. See supra
note 101.
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practice and the law of unauthorized practice are at odds. Many unauthor-
ized practice rules and statutes prohibit any form of law practice within the
state unless bar admission or pro hac vice admission, when applicable, has
been secured. In Wisconsin, for example, it is illegal to "render ... any legal
service for any other person"' 0 5 "without having first obtained a license to
practice law as an attorney of court of record in this state."'' 0 6 Of course,
lawyers from other states, who are unlicensed in Wisconsin, render legal
services in Wisconsin everyday; the state's economy could not survive with-
out it.
2. Residence of Client
One of the justifications for licensing lawyers is the protection of future
clients from unskilled or unethical practitioners. Presumably, under a state-
based system, each state is concerned only with its own residents and others
who may seek legal services within its boundaries. Does the state have any
legitimate licensing interest in out-of-state lawyers who represent state resi-
dents but who do not enter the state to do so?
There is certainly nothing to stop a resident of a one state from crossing
the state line to retain and confer with a lawyer in a second state. It is diffi-
cult to imagine any basis of which the first state could assert regulatory au-
thority over the lawyer in such circumstances. 0 7 The situation may be
different, however, if the lawyer attempted to attract clients in the state in
which the lawyer was not licensed, for example by advertising her services in
that state. The effort to develop a clientele in a state strongly implicates that
state's interest in protecting its residents from unskilled or unethical law-
yers.10 8 Thus, while the mere acceptance of employment from a state's resi-
dent may not justify the state's invoking its regulatory powers against the
lawyer, an effort by the lawyer to attract a clientele in the state may be ade-
quate justification, at least in relation to the purposes of lawyer licensing. 0 9
105. Wis. STAT. § 757.30(2) (1985-86).
106. WIs. STAT. § 757.30(1) (1985-86). But see Appell v. Rainer, 43 N.J. 313, 316, 204 A.2d
146, 148 (1964) (negotiations conducted by New York lawyer in New Jersey were not illegal prac-
tice of law in New Jersey).
107. See Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (New
Hampshire court could not assert personal jurisdiction over Massachusetts law firm in legal mal-
practice action brought by New Hampshire client where underlying matter was solely within the
jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts). See also Annotation, 11 Prof. Liab. Rep. 930, 932-33
(1986) (Illinois courl does not have jurisdiction over out of state attorney who failed to file an
administrative appeal in Illinois).
108. See cases cited supra note 8. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
109. What types of advertising and solicitation justify regulation by the second state is a complex
question. Advertising by the lawyer may be through media located in the lawyer's home state but
received in the second state. It may be national advertising or, at the other extreme, targeted direct
mail advertising sent into the second state. Moreover, advertising can either succeed or fail in
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3. Venue of Matter
If the connection between the out-of-state lawyer and the state is the law-
yer's representation of a client in a matter pending before a state court or
administrative agency, the state's licensing interest in protecting the adminis-
tration of justice in the state is implicated. A concern for the administration
of justice in the state is one of the acceptable justifications for lawyer
licensing.
Most states assert their regulatory interest over out-of-state lawyers who
are engaged in a matter litigated in the state by requiring the out-of-state
lawyer to be admitted pro hac vice in the matter and to associate with local
counsel to assist in the representation. Pro hac vice admission, especially
coupled with the local counsel rule, has serious deficiencies;' 1 nevertheless,
the justification for state interference with locally unlicensed practice before
state courts or agencies is clear.
4. Applicable Law
A client who is active in a state may rely upon an out-of-state lawyer for
advice respecting that activity. For example, an out-of-state lawyer may pre-
pare documents necessary to comply with the state's securities laws or may
draft a will for a state resident knowing that the will is going to be probated
ultimately in the state's court system. In such circumstances, the locally un-
licensed lawyer's only significant nexus with the state is in interpreting, ap-
plying, and advising the client with respect to the state's laws.
This relationship between an out-of-state lawyer and the state is probably
insufficient to justify the state's assertion of its licensing interest. "' If any of
the licensing justifications does apply, the most likely is concern for the ad-
ministration of justice in the state. Even this link is tenuous, however, when
attracting clients who are residents of the second state. All of these factors should be considered in
determining whether the second state should regulate the lawyer's conduct.
110. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 956 (1979). See also Kalish, Pro
Hac Vice Admission: A Proposal, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 367.
Death penalty cases provide an extreme example of the deficiencies of pro hac vice admission. In
one recent Texas case, a Wisconsin lawyer agreed to represent a death row convict in his efforts to
set aside the death sentence. The Wisconsin lawyer agreed to the representation because no Texas
lawyer could be found to take the case. These cases are extremely time-consuming and emotionally
wrenching, and no public money is available to pay counsel.
The Wisconsin lawyer filed a motion seeking a stay of execution before filing a motion seeking pro
hac vice admission. The motion for stay was filed first because the execution date was imminent and
because diligent efforts to secure local counsel had failed. The State responded to the motion for
stay by seeking to have it stricken on the basis that the Wisconsin lawyer was not admitted in Texas.
Local counsel was thereafter found, and the stay was granted. State v. Gardner, No. F-83-93161-
JLR (265th Dis. Tex. 1988). See generally Reid, Caught on Death Row, STUDENT LAWYER 15,
Jan. 1988, at 15 (describing shortage of local counsel in death row cases).
111. Accord C. WOLFRAM, supra note 102, at 867.
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the only activity by the out-of-state lawyer is advising the client with respect
to applicable state law.
An out-of-state lawyer's activities in interpreting or applying the state's
law, therefore, do not necessarily justify the state's assertion of regular juris-
diction over the lawyer.
5. Summary
A state is not justified in regulating the practice of an out-of-state lawyer
merely because one of the following occurs: the lawyer is present on business
within the state; the client is a state resident; or the lawyer is applying the
state's law to a client matter. On the other hand, an appearance by the out-
of-state lawyer before a state court or other tribunal may, without more, jus-
tify the state's regulatory involvement.
B. THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY OF A STATE LICENSE
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the issue of multistate
practice by making three points: by establishing that the state in which a
lawyer is licensed has disciplinary jurisdiction over the lawyer's extraterrito-
rial conduct, by noting that "lawyers frequently act outside the territorial
limits of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice," and by
warning that "activity in another jurisdiction [that] is substantial and contin-
uous" may violate unauthorized practice rules. 112 The Model Rules also rec-
ognize that each state determine for itself which activities constitute the
practice of law for which a license is required.' 13
The "substantial and continuous" standard suggested by the Model Rules
is far more lenient than the standards found in most states' unauthorized
practice statutes.' 14 On the other hand, it may accurately reflect the stan-
dard employed by states in enforcing their standards. 1 5 It may also reflect
the prevailing view as to the appropriate limits on extra-territorial practice
held by lawyers engaged in multistate practice.
The unacceptable status quo is that lawyers frequently violate the letter of
112. MODEL RULES Rule 8.5 comment (1983) (cross-referencing Rule 5.5, concerning the unau-
thorized practice of law).
113. Id. Rule 5.5 comment (1983).
114. Cf Rhode, supra note 101, at 45-46.
115. Professor Wolfram has concluded:
[Sleveral states have tolerated in-state law practice if the client is a regular client for whom
the lawyer typically performs work in the lawyer's own licensed state and either (1) the
lawyer's presence is an isolated occurrence and the work is not extensive in duration or (2)
the in-state practice is more extensive but is 'incidental' to advising a client on a multi-
state problem.
C. WOLFRAM, supra note 102, at 867-68 (footnotes omitted).
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unauthorized practice statutes. In addition, the spirit of those statutes gener-
ally seems protectionist, and in that respect, lawyers frequently violate their
spirit as well. Lawyers face a serious dilemma in acting within such an
inadequate legal framework. The customary practice is well-described by the
"substantial and continuous" standard of the Model Rules, but this standard
is not generally sanctioned by written law. 116 Thus, lawyers are constantly at
jeopardy while engaged in multistate practice. This jeopardy is fairly limited
in that courts usually impose no greater sanction than the requirement that
local counsel be retained. (Of course, this "sanction" may cost the client
thousands of dollars, and in that respect it is not nominal.) Nevertheless,
lawyers must balance client interest and self-interest in a legal environment
in which technical law violations are the norm.
A direct legal challenge to the highly restrictive unauthorized practice
statutes is not likely to prevail. The closest Supreme Court pronouncement
on point, offered in Leis v. Flynt, I" 7 is discouraging:
There is no right of federal origin that permits [out-of-state] lawyers to
appear in state courts without meeting that State's bar admission require-
ments. This Court, on several occasions, has sustained state bar rules that
excluded out-of-state counsel from practice altogether or on a case-by-case
basis.' 18
Thus, one state's license to practice law apparently provides few extra-
territorial rights respecting law practice in a second state. The question is
one of sound state policy, not of established federal right.
C. REGULATING LAW PRACTICE THAT IS NOT
''SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS"
Extra-territorial practice by a licensed lawyer in a foreign state should not
require formal admission in that foreign state unless the practice is "substan-
tial and continuous," the standard suggested in the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.'19 The one troublesome question is how (or whether) to
116. The standard appears in a comment to the Model Rules and thus is not part of the written
law even of those states that have adopted the Model Rules.
117. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
118. Id. at 443. But see Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604. 607 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme
Court has considered whether an out-of-state attorney has a fourteenth amendment due process
right to practice in a state in which he is not a member of the bar and held that there is no such
right. The Court, however, made it clear that it had not addressed the issue of whether a litigant's
right of counsel of choice includes the right to out-of-state counsel.... Thus, we conclude that the
right to counsel pro hac vice is encompassed analytically within the right to counsel of choice, and as
such should be examined within the analytic framework generally employed in right to counsel of
choice cases.") (citations omitted).
119. MODEL RULES Rule 8.5 comment (1983).
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regulate extra-territorial practice that is less than "substantial and
continuous."
Pro hac vice admission is the common device for regulating limited law
practice by a lawyer regularly licensed in a foreign jurisdiction.1 20 Pro hac
vice regulation, as it generally operates, suffers from many serious flaws: it
applies only to law practice incident to litigation; the availability of pro hac
vice admission is ad hoc and within the often-unbridled discretion of a trial
court judge; and local counsel must be retained to assist in the matter, often
at considerable additional expense. 121
These problems with pro hac vice admission must be resolved before multi-
state law practice will be effectively regulated. Resolving these problems
means addressing three central issues:
1. If, when a lawyer's practice in a state is "substantial and continuous,"
regular bar admission should be required, what lower threshold of activity
by an out-of-state lawyer should trigger the requirement for a limited form
of admission (e.g., pro hac vice admission)?
2. Who should be responsible for approving limited admission and what
standards should be applied?
3. Should local counsel requirements be imposed in some or all limited
admission cases?
1. When to Require Limited Admission
As outlined earlier, whether a state is justified in regulating an out-of-state
lawyer's practice cannot be based categorically on whether the lawyer is
physically present within the state, whether the client is a stat6-resident, or
whether the state's law is being or will be applied in the matter.1 22 Neverthe-
less, each of these factors has some bearing upon whether the state may be
justified in regulating a given lawyer's practice.
Limited admission, like pro hac vice admission, should be restricted with
respect to the matters that the out-of-state lawyer is permitted to handle. Pro
hac vice admission permits the lawyer to practice with respect to a particular
matter pending before a particular court. Limited admission might similarly
120. A recent count revealed that "twelve states have statutory provisions on pro hac vice admis-
sion, twenty-nine have court rules, two are covered by bar rules, five have a combination of statute
and court rule, two have a bar rule and a statute, and one state is without any explicit provision."
MICHELMAN, PRo HAC VICE REGULATION-IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST? 4 (1984).
121. See generally Kalish, Pro Hac Vice Admission: A Proposal, 1979 S. ILL. L.J. 367; Misner,
Local Associated Counsel in the Federal District Courts: A Call For Change, 67 CORN. L. REV. 345
(1982); Comment, Due Process and Pro Hac Vice Appearances by Attorneys: Does Any Protection
Remain?, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 133 (1980); Note, Analysis of Illinois'Restrictions on the Practice of
Law by Out-of-State Attorneys: Pro Hac Vice Model Rule Proposal, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 695
(1985); Note, Erasing Multistate Practice Restrictions-"Good Cause" Based Limited Admissions, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1182 (1976).
122. See supra Part IV(A).
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be restricted to a particular matter, or related group of matters, on behalf of
a particular client. Limited admission might also be restricted by time con-
straints, so that after the established time period, the limited admission
would lapse if not renewed.
The key to an effective system, and the ingredient now most lacking, is
bright-line standards separating unregulated extra-territorial practice from
regulated extra-territorial practice. Pro hac vice rules usually accomplish this
in litigation settings by requiring pro hac vice admission in order to make an
appearance as counsel. For other forms of practice, new standards are
needed. Those standards may be expressed as time limits. For example, if a
lawyer spends all or part of fifteen days of one year in a foreign state on a
particular client's business, the lawyer could be subject to that state's limited
admission requirements.1 23 Perhaps different bright line standards could be
developed based on something other than time spent in the jurisdiction. The
point is to define the extent to which law practice by an out-of-state lawyer
may be undertaken in the state without any formal requirements and to pro-
vide some safeguards if the lawyer's activity is more extensive.
2. Standards and Procedures for Limited Admission
Limited admission should be granted as a matter of right to those who
meet the standards. The central criterion should be whether the lawyer has a
valid and active license to practice law from another state. The lawyer
should complete a short questionnaire that elicits directory-type information,
identifies the client, and identifies the matter or matters for which, limited
admission is sought. Verification should be secured from the client and from
bar authorities in the state where the lawyer is licensed. No further investi-
gation should be done; the lawyer's license in her home state should be secur-
ity enough. In short, an expedited process is recommended in which limited
admission is granted as a matter of course upon receipt of a short application
from the lawyer, verification of representation by the client, and certification
of bar membership by bar admission authorities in the lawyer's home state.
This limited admission process would be most efficient if administered by
the state bar admission authority. Pro hac vice admission could become a
part of the overall limited admission process, with the court in which the
matter is to be heard being advised of the out-of-state lawyer's limited admis-
sion status.
3. Local Counsel Requirements
The requirement that local counsel be retained significantly increases the
123. Obviously, this time expenditure falls well short of the "continuous and substantial" stan-
dard that triggers a requirement for regular admission.
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cost of legal services. Given that the client must foot the bill, it seems terri-
bly presumptuous to defend this practice by asserting that it protects the
client. More plausibly, local counsel requirements can be justified as protect-
ing the administration of justice in the state. The theory underlying this jus-
tification is that out-of-state lawyers are less familiar with local substantive
and procedural law and are more likely to delay or disrupt proceedings, ob-
struct negotiations, or otherwise impede the proper resolution of legal mat-
ters. These are not trivial concerns, especially when the state has not itself
assessed the lawyer's competence and character.
On the other hand, local counsel requirements have at least two harmful
effects: they significantly increase the cost of legal services and they require
clients to enter into lawyer-client relationships against their will and not for
their own benefit.1 24 It would be unjustifiable to impose local'counsel re-
quirements in all limited admission cases, even in all matters involving litiga-
tion. The stakes and risks in particular matters often will not justify the costs
(financial and other) of local counsel.
When and why local counsel requirements should be imposed in limited
admission cases requires further study and discussion. The very lawyers
whose multistate practices require their frequent affiliation with local counsel
also often serve as local counsel to other finns. Many lawyers are exper-
ienced and objective respecting the local counsel issue, and their views should
be sought.
D. SUMMARY
A state-based system of bar admission does not have to unreasonably re-
strict multistate law practice. A sensible system would recognize that an out-
of-state lawyer's activities in a state where he is not licensed may fall within
any of three categories. First, it may be "substantial and continuous," a
standard suggested in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in which case
regular bar admission should be required. Second, it may be significant but
involve only a single matter or related group of matters, in which case a
limited license procedure, akin topro hac vice admission, would be appropri-
ate. Third, it may not rise to the level of significance requiring limited admis-
sion, in which case the activity is permissible extra-territorial practice based
on the lawyer's home license.
If states appropriately define and regulate these three levels of practice
activity, they will better protect the public and allow lawyers to better serve
the public.
124. This latter situation sometimes occurs with criminal defendants, except that then it is gener-
ally because they are not otherwise represented by counsel. Local counsel requirements are differ-




The movement toward national standards in bar admission is unmistaka-
ble and, for the most part, beneficial. The need for continued movement in
this direction seems urgent when developments in the economy, and society
as a whole, prompt changes in law practice to which state bar admission
rules are slow to respond. In part, the slow response reflects the vulnerability
of the state-based system to protectionist urges. In addition, it reflects the
fundamental division of the legal profession into two hemispheres, one com-
prised of lawyers who represent large organizations and the other of lawyers
who represent individuals. 125 Lawyers in the first hemisphere often engage in
multistate practice and those in the second rarely do. As Heintz and Lau-
man have suggested, "the simple view of the bar as a single, unified profes-
sion no longer fits the facts."'1 26
National organizations, particularly the American Bar Association and
the National Conference of Bar Examiners, should organize a study of multi-
state practice issues. This study should be directed toward standards for mo-
tion admission and limited bar admission. States have displayed a
willingness to adopt meaningful and appropriate national standards in many
areas of bar admission. Strong national leadership in developing balanced
standards for multistate practice is urgently needed.
125. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMEN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(1982), reprinted in HAZARD & RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGU-
LATION 60 (2d ed. 1988).
126. Id. at 72.
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